Marc J. Sirois

There is no doubting that Lebanon faces a series of daunting challenges in the coming weeks and months. Even if a president can be elected in a manner that dulls tensions instead of sharpening them, all indications are that the country will remain in play within the arena of international power politics. Perhaps even more importantly,‏ it will retain profound internal divisions about a host of issues, not least of which is what democracy can and should mean for a country with Lebanon`s history and makeup.‏

It is (or should be) painfully clear that the current system of confessional power-sharing has to go. The formula has been tweaked several times since independence in 1943, perverted during the 1975-1990 Civil War, and simultaneously entrenched and co-opted during the 1990-2005 period of Syrian "tutelage" . At no time, however, has it actually worked – or even come close to doing so. Reasonable people can and will disagree as to why this has been so, but there is little that is defensible to be found in the statecraft and leadership that‏ have been foisted on successive generations of Lebanese.‏

My own feeling is that the system`s habits of crisis and failure stem from the fact that while various constitutional amendments have altered its shape (e.g., Taif`s reapportioning of parliamentary seats) and its practices (e.g. laughable electoral laws that have, quite literally and by design, made electoral fraud an institution), none‏ has affected the core causes of Lebanese political dysfunction.‏

Indeed, they have served only to provide a constant source of fuel for new disputes.‏

The most easily identifiable culprit remains sectarianism, which actively prevents the emergence of national identity, perpetuates tribal politics at the expense of useful ideological debate, and invites foreign powers to meddle in the affairs of a land that looks like an ally waiting to be manufactured with the assistance of one or‏ another disgruntled minority. Worst of all, it inculcates all and sundry with an Orwellian propensity to reflexively deny the legitimacy – and sometimes to ignore the existence – of those with different views.‏

Another culprit is an economic arrangement whose claims to free-market status must have Adam Smith trying to claw his way out of the grave.‏

The most glaring example of this is the "exclusive agency" setup, which goes out of its way to prevent competition of any sort among would-be importers of the same product. Not only does not it not work (like most of its rules, the Lebanese state does not allow this one to be enforced very well – and price gougers are a highly cooperative lot among themselves), but it also presumes to replace the judgment of the companies that make those imports. At least conventional protectionism, while keeping consumer prices artificially high, can theoretically work to protect domestic industries; exclusive agency exerts the same inflationary pressure but serves only to line the‏ pockets of a select few. Finally, and most devastatingly, it is tethered to the confessional arrangement, so it locks a significant proportion of the population out of many key markets because of the books their parents use to pray.‏

Then there is the legal system, the potential independence of which threatens to undo the cozy regimens of political and economic oligopoly that currently prevail. Accordingly, that too is subjected to the demonstrably ineffective standards of confessionalism, not to mention periodic shrieks of horror from legislators who know that a truly independent judiciary means the end of their inherited money-making machines and the possibility that they and their sons might have to seek gainful employment.‏

So what does all of the above have to do with the power struggle between the ruling March 14 coalition and its March 8 opponents?‏

Plenty. Take the words of one Rayyan al-Shawwaf, whose opinion piece on The Daily Star`s own pages this week makes a fairly standard March 14ista reference to "Lebanese who played a leading role in the anti-Syrian demonstrations of [2005], whose representatives formed the March 14 coalition." The problem with this escription is that anyone who was at those demonstrations knows full well that a significant role was played by supporters of Michel Aoun`s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), now in alliance with the opposition. And there is the rub:‏

Given what Shawwaf says are the opposition`s "anti-democratic tendencies", in his world Aounists who favor Lebanese democracy and sovereignty do not exist. They never existed.‏

Accepting this line of reasoning, though, requires us to master the art described in Orwell`s "1984," that of forgetting we know something – and then of forgetting that we forgot. In this instance, it means wiping out any recollection of the fact that despite overwhelming odds, when Aoun had a chance to fight for Lebanon`s independence from Syrian "tutelage" , he did so with something approaching foolhardy enthusiasm. We must forget, too, that during Aoun`s "War of Liberation," some of those who currently challenge his influence within Lebanon`s Christian community sided with the Syrian "tutelage"  – and that many of the same people have a long history of alliance with another invader, Israel. No matter: Aoun, it seems, is the man who must answer questions about his loyalty to Lebanon.‏

The stacking of the system against specific religious communities and/or minority political groupings is another factor that keeps the current struggle at a fever pitch. It is frequently argued, for instance, that because Lebanon "is now a democracy," mass demonstrations like those that drove the Syrians out and (buttressed by a tactical alliance with Hizbullah) effectively brought March 14 to power are no longer legitimate expressions of opposition sentiment. In fact, we are told, public protests are "coups d`etat" which must be put down by the army or, if the latter sensibly demurs, cleared by young March 14istas wielding sticks or worse. Gone is the usual opprobrium at non-state actors carrying weapons, an activity specifically allowed for – as a means of deterrence and/or resistance in the face of Israel`s superior conventional strength – in the ministerial statement that brought Hizbullah into the Cabinet.‏

Instead of using demonstrations, the opposition is advised to trust in a system designed to ensure many of its members` under-representation in Parliament, even though the ruling coalition has made clear its desire to do away with the pre-eminent compensating factors for that lopsidedness: the time-honored practices of selecting consensus presidents and installing governments (in fact if not in name) of national unity. As though this were not enough to convince the opposition that they are being frozen out of the game, members of the ruling majority have also indicated that they would like nothing better than to use the courts – including the Special Tribunal to try suspects in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hairi – to settle old scores.‏

From the opposition`s perspective, therefore, it looks like March 14`s sole philosophy is to retain those "traditions" which have enriched and empowered its leaders and their constituents, while jettisoning or disregarding those that have not. This carries its most dangerous potential when applied to the principle of consensus that long predates the period of Syrian control. The unity that was articulated under this banner might have been shallow and even phony, but at least it contributed a positive tone to political discourse. Now we are told that things like unity and another March 14 bugbear, compromise, are undemocratic.‏

But these are precisely the things needed to keep the country together while it sorts out a way forward and its squabbling political parties rebuild some degree of trust. This is not Britain, where history entitles the leader of the opposition to some basic but crucial assumptions: that the prime minister will neither jail him nor betray‏

him to a foreign power, and that the judiciary would dismiss attempts at such abuses if they took place.‏

Until people like Aoun and his partner, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, can so much as hope for similar treatment, they will have every reason to question the legitimacy of the current system and the intentions of those who control it.‏